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Amid what is now recognized as a years-long democratic recession that includes not only 
backslidings in younger democracies but dysfunctions in established ones, it is important to see 
the phenomenon not only through the lenses of experts at Freedom House or V-Dem, but from 
the standpoint of ordinary citizens. It is they, after all, who should have the final say over what 
kind of democratic political system they are experiencing and whether its quality of governance 
lives up to their expectations.  
 Support for and satisfaction with democracy may come from many sources including the 
provision of political goods, economic success, protection of human safety, and improvement in 
governance (in terms of transparency, fairness, impartiality, and the like). Such tangible benefits 
deeply affect citizens’ commitment to democracy.1 Experts make their assessments of how 
democracy is doing in this country and ordinary citizens make theirs. What citizens experience 
may accord with what the experts see, or it may not. By offering a citizen-based perspective, we 
are not dismissing the experts, but we do hope to enrich the overall picture of the current state of 
democracy around the world.  
Using the longitudinal data accrued from the Global Barometer Surveys (GBS),2 we can 
track changes in popular orientation toward democracy in 51 countries across three continents 
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over the past decade of democratic decline [Number updated after excluding South Asia.—
YHC_KPH]. Our data show significant backsliding in the attitudinal underpinnings of 
democracy between 2006–08 and 2016–18, buttressing the early expert warnings of global 
democratic recession. Declining support for democracy is closely related to diminishing 
satisfaction with how democracy works in practice. In some countries, disappointment with poor 
governance has led people to put more trust in the executive than in the legislature, in hopes that 
a strong leader can solve all ills. The risks of such a course are clear: Focusing power in the 
executive tends to erode checks and balances and may even pave the way to electoral autocracy. 
A strong leader (often a populist) sold as a savior can undermine institutions and the underlying 
principle of popular sovereignty in pursuit of immediate goals. Such potent leaders tend, 
moreover, to heighten political polarization and this has a cost since the polarization itself makes 
democracy less appealing.  
Our empirical analysis suggests that solving the structural and institutional problems 
responsible for poor governance and eroded mechanisms of popular accountability is the only 
way to make up democracy’s lost decade.  
 
Expert versus Popular Assessments 
 
How do experts’ assessments of democracy compare to popular evaluations over the last 
decade? In order to answer this question, we compare the aggregate data on popular support for 
democracy that we have been able to gather from GBS3 with the annual Freedom House index. 
The data available for East Asia were gathered across the period 2006–16, while for sub-Saharan 
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Africa and Latin America the period was 2005–18.4 [Cut South Asia b/c data is old.—LJD； 
Done YHC_KPH] 
At the most general level, New York–based Freedom House divides the world into three 
parts: Countries are Free, Partly Free, or Not Free. One can gauge the magnitude of global 
democratic recession by calculating the percentage of net changes in terms of democratic 
backsliding from one point in time to a later point. Looking at how widespread popular support 
for democracy is in each given society (because such support is so important to democratic 
consolidation) we create our own threefold classification. Our gauge is a standardized question 
which asks respondents if they agree that “democracy is always preferable to any other kind of 
government.”5 Based on answers to this question, countries can be classed as “robust,” “weak,” 
or “fragile” democracies. Following Larry Diamond, we call any country where more than two-
thirds of respondents explicitly agree that democracy is always better a “robust” democracy (at 
least insofar as its foundation in popular sentiment goes). Countries where this figure is between 
50 and 66 percent we call “weak,” and any country where it falls below 50 percent we call a 
“fragile” democracy.6  
We know there are pitfalls here. The question’s use of the “D-word” might inflate the 
level of support for democracy, for instance, given that many respondents may feel it “socially 
unacceptable” to deny the value of democracy itself. Then too, in some authoritarian countries 
the observed level of support for democracy can seem higher than it really is because the regime 
calls itself a democracy (usually with at least one adjective attached) and many respondents who 
seem to be avowing their endorsement of democracy will in fact merely be echoing that party 
line.7 Even when these pitfalls are present, however, comparing changes over time on these 
measures can be revealing.  
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First we examine changes in the two parallel assessments over the same period. For the 
same 51 countries that GBS surveyed periodically between 2005 and 2018, “Free” countries 
dropped from 24 to 19 while “Partly Free” countries increased from 23 to 27. By contrast, the 
changes in popular support for democracy were more dramatic, as “robust” countries dropped 
from 30 to 21 [The figures are updated, excluding South Asia.— YHC_KPH]. 
Across the three regime types, Not Free countries on average registered the highest level 
of support in 2005, followed by Free countries. A decade later, the average level of democracy 
support dropped for each class. In Free countries, the mean support level fell from 67 to 61 
percent, while in the Partly Free set it went from 65 to 62 percent and in Not Free countries from 
80 to 70 percent. [Please fill in the percentages.—LJD] [The percentages are updated, 
excluding South Asia.—YHC_KPH] Within the decade, five countries (Dominican Republic, 
Indonesia, Lesotho, Mali, and Mexico) fell from Free to Partly Free, yet removing them from the 
set of Free countries leaves democracy support within that class little changed.  
Variation within the set of Free countries widened over the decade, indicating that in 
some countries opinions about democracy have become more sharply split. Within Free 
countries, one might identify a growing population of disgruntled citizens who no longer think 
that democracy is always superior to any alternative regime type. When more citizens in Free 
countries think this way (as they have been doing in El Salvador, Brazil, South Africa), one can 
anticipate that fewer people would stand up against violations of democratic principles by 
authoritarian-inclined politicians, and that more people would fall in line behind populist leaders. 
On the other hand, the strong support for democracy that we found in a few Partly Free countries 
(such as Burkina Faso and Venezuela—the latter of which has since become Not Free) means 
that in these countries the ideal of democracy still has a reservoir of support behind it, which 
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suggests potential for democratic advance. Nevertheless, compared to a decade ago, democracy 
has lost appeal across the board, especially among people living in Free countries. 
Data accrued by regular opinion polls such as GBS and the Freedom House’s scores on 
which the three-part classification is based stem from two different approaches to assessing the 
state of democracy in a given country. The former is basically bottom-up replying on what 
ordinary citizens have been experiencing at the grassroots while the latter is essentially top-down 
counting on the qualitative judgement by the experts who typically places emphasis on major 
events of system-wide or long-term significance. It often takes a big change (such as the 2012 
military coup that knocked Mali from Free down to Partly Free status) to cause the experts at 
Freedom House to shift a country from one class to another—though it is possible for a country 
at the low end of one category to fall into the category below due to no more than a small 
change. [I am really uncomfortable with making too much of changes in these big FH 
categories. A country at the low end of Free can fall down into Partly Free due to a small 
change. Other countries may fall farther but remain in the Free category.----LJD Note 
qualifying language that I added after the long dash.—PJC; We have tried to tone down the 
contrast between the two – YHC_KPH]   
Therefore, regular opinion polls are more sensitive to what is happening on the ground 
and for that reason they can pick up undercurrents before their cumulative effects help trigger 
ostensible political events.  This probably explains why scholars examining the changes in all 
Freedom House scores between 1972 and 2012 concluded that the trend of democratic recession 
was marginal since it mainly occurred in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa, regions where 
backsliding democracies already tended to be frail even before they began actually regressing 
toward authoritarianism.8  
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Another expert survey, V-Dem (short for Varieties of Democracy, www.v-dem.net), 
traced the changes across 2006–16 and concluded that there existed challenges to democracy but 
no evidence showing that “democracy is caught in a global crisis.”9 These observations lagged 
behind our survey data, which reveal that support for democracy was already in decline across 
the board during the same period. In Latin America, Latinobarómetro found a gradual decline in 
support for democracy that had begun by 2008. Not until 2018, after the rise of rightist populism 
in the West and the conspicuous ascendance of China and Russia as authoritarian “role models”, 
did the two expert surveys recognize global democratic retreat as a reality.  
Looking at data points over time, we can see that popular discontent had been brewing 
for a decade in democracies and has eroded popular support for the democratic regime in most 
countries.  
 
Specific and Diffuse Support, 2005–18 
 
The GBS collects data on both support for and satisfaction with democracy. Satisfaction 
manifests itself through popular approval of how the given country’s democratic system is 
performing. Respondents are asked, “How satisfied are you with the way democracy is working 
in [our country]?” In theory, support for democracy should be more stable than satisfaction, 
which can rise or fall due to government performance. Another way of putting it is that while 
satisfaction is a governance question, support is a regime question. Nevertheless, scholars 
increasingly believe that the legitimacy of any given democratic regime is affected eventually by 
the outputs it produces.10 In other words, while the short-term performance of a government does 
not affect citizens’ support for democracy as an ideal regime type, repeated failures to deliver 
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both political and economic goods will sooner or later start costing democracy some of its 
support. 
The last decade has made it clear that the growing problems of elites abusing power and 
violating democratic principles in third-wave democracies have exacerbated the decline in 
satisfaction with democracy expressed by ordinary people. This declining satisfaction has in turn 
eaten away at popular support for democracy and weakened the pro-democratic popular 
sentiments that should act as a barrier to democratic backsliding.  
Francis Fukuyama has pointed out that the root cause of rising popular discontent is the 
poor performance of third-wave democracies that lack state capacity to maintain rule of law, 
accountability, and the delivery of basic public goods.11 Corruption, government inefficiency and 
abuses of power plague almost all new democracies, especially in lower-income countries. At the 
same time, globalization and the 2008 global financial crisis hit many third-wave democracies 
hard as world trade stagnated and commodity prices plunged amid monetary policies that staved 
off instability but at the price of worsening inequality.  
Figure 1 shows the relationship between satisfaction with the way democracy works and 
support for democracy across regions over multiple waves of Barometer surveys. We note three 
key findings. First, across all regions—sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and East Asia—we 
detected a downward trend in satisfaction with democracy (as shown by the data points moving 
to the left along the horizontal axis). Latin America, which is surveyed annually, registered the 
most glaring drop in satisfaction, especially since 2010. In 2018, the average share of 
respondents across the region who said that they were satisfied with how democracy was 
working in their respective countries only reached 25 percent. In Africa, the magnitude of 
growing dissatisfaction is significant as well. East Asian countries have maintained fairly high 
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levels of democratic satisfaction with only a mild setback between 2010 and 2016. The region’s 
average is pushed up, however, by the much higher levels of satisfaction with “democracy” 
expressed by respondents in nondemocracies such as China and Singapore. There, the regimes 
call themselves democracies but attach adjectives to qualify them as something distinct from 
classic liberal democracies. [Is this still a current practice by these regimes—to label 
themselves “democracies” but of a special sort? Larry thinks maybe not. Cut if no longer 
relevant.—PJC; As of today, the leaders in China, Vietnam and Singapore still exercise  
“democracy” discourse and narrative --- YHC_HKP] If we focus on just the Free countries in 
East Asia, the satisfaction level is modest, averaged at 61% across Japan, Korea, Mongolia and 
Taiwan in 2016, compared to 72% in hybrid regimes and nondemocracies. [Give the average for 
these E.A. Free countries from the latest survey.—LJD; The 2019 data from Japan and South 
Korea are still being cleaned ---YHC_KPH]  
Second, the relationship between support for democracy as a regime and satisfaction with 
how democracy performs is complex. Our data reveal substantial variation across regions. In 
Africa, ordinary people have maintained their relatively high support for democracy despite 
decreasing levels of satisfaction with democracy. In Latin America, and to some extent in East 
Asia as well, support for democracy and satisfaction with democracy are tightly linked. Once 
again, Latin America registered the sharpest decline in support for democracy. There, the trend 
followed the economic cycle: The drop in support for democracy does not begin until 2010, 
which is when governments began running out of funds to counter the negative impacts of the 
2008 financial crisis.  
Third, in most countries satisfaction with democracy has registered consistently below 
support for democracy (indicated by all the data points that are above the diagonal line in Figure 
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1). East Asia, where citizens’ support for democracy consistently trails satisfaction (indicated by 
all the data points below the diagonal line), presents a perplexing anomaly to this generalization. 
The source of this anomaly is two-fold: [It’s not perplexing if you separate out the autocracies 
in East Asia from the democracies.—LJD; Our data show that Support trailing behind 
Satisfaction in Taiwan and Mongolia consistently and three out of four waves in South Korea 
---YHC_KPH] First, it is due to a strong presence of high-performing hybrid and one-party 
regimes in the region, which pushed up popular satisfaction with regime performance without 
necessarily lifting the support for democracy. Next, it is due to the fact that a large number of 
citizens in East Asian young democracies – in particular  Taiwan, South Korea and Mongolia -- 
tend to apply an unusually  high benchmark in judging democratic system while a bulk of the 
baby-boom generations still harboring lingering nostalgia with the country’s authoritarian past. 
In our 2016 survey, 25%, 28% and 37% of our respondents respectively in South Korea, Taiwan 
and Mongolia, instead of agreeing with that “Democracy is always more preferable to any other 
kind of government,” embraced the view that “Under some circumstances, an authoritarian 
government can be preferable to a democratic one”. [Talk of a “perplexing anomaly” is 
misleading because there are two very different patterns:  One for the authoritarian countries 
such as China and another for the democracies. It would be better to disaggregate East Asian 
countries into those two groups, then rewrite this passage to reflect that way of sort out the 
data. Or in other words, please compute two sets of averages for East Asia, one for 
democracies, one for nondemocracies, and then you have established this point without the 
need for a “probably.”—PJC; Based on our empirical analysis, separating the democracies 





FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
Regional averages, of course, have the drawback of concealing important nuances that 
can observed at the level of individual countries. In Figure 2, therefore, we get more “granular” 
by ranking countries according to their Freedom House status (Free, Partly Free, or Not Free) as 
of 2005, with arrows to display the changes in support and satisfaction (see Figure 2). The arrow 
represents data in the later time and two vertical dashed lines refer to 66 percent and 50 percent, 
the two thresholds that differentiate the countries with robust support for democracy from those 
where such support is weak.  
In East Asia, support for democracy increased in five of thirteen cases, but in only one 
case (Japan) did support for democracy surpass the consolidation threshold of 66 percent.  Japan 
also registered a significant increase in satisfaction with democracy during this period thanks to 
the tenacity of Abe government in revamping Japan’s economy after suffering two “lost 
decades”. [Cambodia has no democracy to consolidate. Let’s not list it here.—LJD; OK---
YHC-KPH] Both satisfaction with and support for democracy declined in most East Asian 
countries. In the cases of Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan, curiously, increased 
satisfaction with democracy did not feed into greater support for it. Indonesia is the only one of 
our East Asian cases that Freedom House downgraded a category, shifting the country’s status 
from Free to Partly Free because of a restrictive NGO law adopted in 2013. (Indonesia was 
already near the margin so this single change was enough to make Freedom House shift the 
country’s categorization.) Support for democracy remained high in Indonesia throughout the 
period covered by this study.  
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In Latin America, the trend was similar. Fourteen of eighteen countries saw a fall in 
democracy support from 2005 to 2018. All ten Free countries, except Peru, [How many were 
there?—PJC; Ten] manifested different degrees of declining support with El Salvador 
registering the sharpest drop from 70% to 30%. By 2018, six of the ten Free countries in the 
region have fallen under the “weak” category with Costa Rico being the only Free country that 
has stayed above our “robust” threshold. [high? High but declining?—LJD ] Across Latin 
America, the aftermath of the economic crisis (2010 and later) saw countries exhaust their 
capacity to undertake countercyclical fiscal policies to try to soften the impact of the crisis. 
Protest and ungovernability that has occurred with dissatisfaction with the performance of 
democracy has finally taken a toll on democracy itself. The region’s average level of satisfaction 
has dropped from 46% to 25% between 2010 and 2018. This negative gravitation has dragged 
down the region’s average level of support for democracy by a magnitude of 14%. While 
growing disenchantment with democracy did not to give noticeable rise to support for 
authoritarianism ought right, it did lower the barrier for the return of non-democratic option as 
more Latino respondents embraced the view that “For people like me, it does not matter whether 
we have a democratic or a nondemocratic regime.”  [This point seems disconnected from the 
survey data. Demonstrate the impact of these actions on public support for and satisfaction 
with democracy, or drop this passage.—LJD]. 
In sub-Saharan Africa, support for democracy rose over the decade in eleven of twenty 
countries—five [five?] Free and five [four?] Partly Free. On average across the region, support 
for democracy held steady, but this was because rising democracy support in some countries 
canceled out declines in others. [NB: We have cut South Asia completely from the article. The 
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data are just too old. Seven years is past useful shelf life. India alone has had two national 
elections since 2013, etc.—LJD/PJC; OK---YHC_KPH] 
Taking all 51 countries listed in Figure 2, we can say that in Latin America and sub-
Saharan Africa, changes in democracy support and changes in satisfaction with democracy are 
strongly correlated with one another (and that strong correlation becomes even more discernable 
when we do the bivariate analysis at the individual level), while in East Asia there is only a weak 
correlation. For Free countries in particular, declining satisfaction with democracy is driving 
down support for democracy in most countries, such as Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Benin, Cape 
Verde and South Africa. [the democracies of?--LJD] There are a few exceptions showing 
distinctive local dynamics. In the case of Mongolia and Peru, where support for democracy had 
already reached its bottom (below the 50% watermark) before the subsequent drop in satisfaction 
with democracy.  In Namibia and Senegal, the floor of support for democracy has been resilient 
enough to withstand the decline in satisfaction.   [the democracies of?—PJC]   
Thus, when we turn to analyzing matters country by country, regime performance turns 
out to be very important in explaining the changes in democracy support observed in most 
countries. In fact, the explanatory power of perceived regime performance—how satisfied people 
say they are with “the way democracy works in their country” [OK? Are we talking about 
democratic regimes here or all regimes? Need to make that clear.—PJC] [To avoid confusion,  
we use the original wording in the survey—YHC_KPH] —is stronger in sub-Saharan Africa 
than it is in Latin America, and far stronger than the effect of regime performance on democracy 
support that we observe in East Asia.  
This confirms our argument that support for democracy is closely tied to satisfaction with 
democracy. Flagging regime performance—failure to deliver consistently the materialist and 
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political “goods” that citizens expect their government to produce—is the driver behind the 
erosion of popular support for democracy observed in recent years. This is true in all three 
regions under consideration, and is also an indicator of the low level of democratic consolidation 
that leaves many third-wave democracies vulnerable to backsliding.  
 
FIGURE 2 HERE 
 
Hope for a Better Future or Abandon Democracy 
 
By calculating the differences between support and satisfaction in 2005 and 2018, 
respectively, we can see whether the gaps between support and satisfaction have widened or 
narrowed in different countries. Overall, citizens in electoral authoritarian regimes (as opposed to 
single-party regimes such as the ones in China and Vietnam) tend to voice a level of support for 
democracy that exceeds their level of satisfaction with how “democracy” (which may, let us 
recall, not be very democratic) is working in their country. This pattern holds for Cambodia and 
Hong Kong in East Asia, Venezuela in Latin America, and Mali, Mozambique, and Uganda in 
sub-Saharan Africa.   
In Latin America, support for democracy eroded over the decade from a regional average 
of 66 percent in 2010 to 52 percent in 2018. Across the quarter-century of the Latinobarómetro, 
respondents in Argentina, Costa Rica, and Uruguay have shown the highest levels of support for 
democracy. Satisfaction with democracy has been volatile in Argentina and Costa Rica due to 
economic crises and corruption scandals, but not so much in Uruguay. In Bolivia and Ecuador, 
new constitutions boosted both support for and satisfaction with democracy early in the Morales 
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and Correa administrations. In each country, however, those increases vanished when the 
president engaged in manipulations aimed at allowing him to retain power. (Ecuador also 
suffered an economic crisis in 2019, two years after Correa left the presidency, when it was 
forced to comply with harsh IMF conditions.) In both countries, elites have been the driving 
force of crisis—Morales ultimately had to leave because of a police rebellion—so it is safe to 
assume that in each place, democracy’s prospects for consolidation depend heavily on how the 
government performs. Democracy is unlikely to prevail when government fails.  
The gap between support and satisfaction has narrowed in many sub-Saharan Africa’s 
Partly Free countries. In Nigeria, Zambia and Malawi, we saw a concurrent upward movement of 
both support and satisfaction and a narrowing of the gap between the two thanks to a much larger 
increase in people’s satisfaction with regime performance. For the incumbent regime this is an 
encouraging trend in terms of regime stability. At the same times, however, it might also imply 
that many hybrid regimes and electoral authoritarian regimes are here to stay and the prospect of 
further  democratization is not that great. [Delete the  following paragraph on Zimbabwe --- 
YHC_KPH] Turning to one of sub-Saharan Africa’s most stubborn authoritarian cases, we 
observe that more political space opened in Zimbabwe following the 2013 adoption of a new 
constitution. In November 2017, long-ruling president Robert Mugabe at last stepped down at 
the age of 93, but this was due to infighting within the ruling party. While Zimbabweans’ 
satisfaction [??—eds.] with democracy more than doubled between 2005 and 2018, going from 
19 to 42 percent, while support for democracy [Do you mean “support for”??—eds.] descended 
by almost 10 points from its peak of 91 percent.  [The original could not have been right. I 
assumed it was inverted, so what really happened is that satisfaction with democracy increased 
from 19 to 42 percent, while support increased to 91 percent. In fact, I just checked the 
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numbers on Afrobarometer online.  Support for democracy (always preferable) went from 
went from 66 percent in 2005 to 75 percent in 2018.  So it wasn’t a drop.  Satisfaction went 
from 14 pct in 2005 to 38 pct in 2018, adding “very” and “Fairly” satisfied. None of this 
aligns exactly with what you reported here. Are you tossing out “don’t know” answers to 
reach these higher percentages? If so, you need to explain that here. PLEASE check the 
data—LJD][We checked the original datasets and confirmed the numbers are correct. The 
discrepancies are due to how we handled “Don’t knows”; we treat them as missing values and 
exclude those cases in calculation. We reported this statistical practice in Endnote 6. There are 
large numbers of don’t knows in the democracy support question in the 2005 Afrobarometer 
survey in many countries. For instance, there are 262 don’t knows in Madagascar, 288 in 
Mozambique, 767 in Tanzania, and 286 in Zimbabwe. --- YHC_KPH]  
The observed trend among East Asia’s Partly Free countries is worrisome. In Singapore, 
the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand, the satisfaction with regime performance remained high 
(or improved substantially) but support for democracy has significantly declined. This might 
reinforce the incumbent’s resolve to constrain the political space while concentrating their effort 
on delivering materialist output.   [Delete the following paragraph as it is vague and 
speculative] Among ordinary people living under regimes that increasingly constrain political 
space, [“Restricted” is a vague term. Please clarify. Do you mean only electoral authoritarian 
regimes?  I am guessing not all authoritarian regimes.—LJD] aspirations for democracy run 
high. This provides grounds for optimism about the future of democracy—it remains the regime 
for which people long when they live under the heels of rulers who rob them of their rights and 
freedoms. Finally, the concurrent downward movement observed in many Free Countries is most 
worrisome. It undermines the democratic resiliency, i.e., that when democratic institutions do not 
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live up to expectations, citizens may turn their backs on democracy. This is a danger to 
democratic regimes that cannot fix chronic problems, such as corruption, racial discrimination, a 
widening income gap, and government inefficiency. Although these countries may retain the 
democratic rankings that experts assign them, there is a risk that fed-up citizens could embrace a 
leader who promises to fix all ills even if it means sacrificing democratic institutions.  
 
Executives, Legislatures, and Trust 
 
As citizens begin to feel powerless to extract effective policy responses from the 
government, populist leaders may come to the fore with vows to “fix things.” Once elected, these 
leaders are likely to find institutions of accountability an inconvenience. Emboldened by a 
majority electoral mandate, executives gather more power into their own hands, maintaining an 
electoral façade but hollowing out checks and balances.12 At first, these leaders bring reforms, 
and citizens’ trust in the executive goes up. Focused on results (there are promises to the voters 
that must be kept), the chief executive may attack the legislature as inefficient and corrupt—a 
roadblock standing in the way of reform. Citizens’ trust in this institution of representation goes 
down. In polling, therefore, a widening gap between the trust that citizens are willing to place in 
the executive and the trust that they accord to the legislature may be the harbinger of executive 
aggrandizement.  
In order to see whether there is a trend among citizens to trust one branch more than the 
other, we calculate the gaps between trust in the executive and trust in the legislature for the 
2005–18 period. There are two main findings. First, when people start trusting the executive 
branch more than the legislature, the country as a whole is likely to display a higher level of 
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democratic satisfaction but a lower level of support for democracy, resulting in a larger gap 
between the two attitudes. In the Philippines, trust in the president rose from 40% to 55%. At the 
same time, trust in the legislature continued to hover around 40%. Support for democracy, 
however, lagged behind satisfaction in 2014 (47% vs. 59%) compared to 2006 (55% vs. 38%), 
indicating that more trust in the president boosts satisfaction but not support for democracy. 
Compared to Arroyo, Aquino’s presidency was more reliable in the eyes of citizens despite 
inadequate responses to natural disasters and ongoing corruption. As democracy unable to 
dismantle political dynasties seeking personal interests through the Congress and other public 
offices, the Filipinos increasingly pin their hopes on leaders. Actually, in the latest survey done 
in 2018, trust in the (Duterte’s) presidency rose to 89% and satisfaction with democracy soared 
to 70%, while support for democracy further plummeted to 40%. Duterte is seen a populist, 
authoritarian-oriented leader who engaged in extrajudicial killing in his war on drugs, but his 
popularity baffled his opponents. This is the paradox of executive aggrandizement.  [Here, you 
should discuss an example (or two) of the main phenomenon, so please add a case here. 
Bangladesh, the outlier case, is excised because as noted we feel the South Asia data is just too 
old to be part of the analysis presented in this essay. Data for Bangladesh ends as of 2013, but 
in 2014 the opposition boycotted the election and there was a transition to what is now a more 
blatantly authoritarian regime.—LJD] While we generally consider executive aggrandizement 
a harbinger to eroding democracy, ordinary people might see it as a necessary measure for 
realizing “democracy.”[We need more cases here (cases from the countries under survey, of 
course) to establish the general validity of this observation about everyday citizens and their 
view of executive aggrandizement.—LJD] In other words, an aggrandizing executive may look 
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to many like a savior when democracy is equated with inefficiency and chaos. [This seems a 
reasonable generalization, but again, an example would help—LJD] 
The second is that when people trust the legislative more than the executive branch, 
support for democracy tends to be on the upswing. The Venezuelan case displays this. Conflicts 
between the executive and the legislature escalated after 2015, when the opposition won an 
overwhelming victory in that year’s legislative elections. President Nicolás Maduro’s response 
was to gather more power and to supplant the National Assembly. He did this with a pro-
government body, the National Constituent Assembly, chosen by means of a July 2017 special 
election (convened by a Maduro decree) that more than forty countries rejected. While 
Venezuela’s Freedom House rating fell from Partly Free to Not Free between 2005 and 2018, the 
continuing high support for democracy (79%) in the presence of low democratic satisfaction 
(12%) [Give figures.—LJD] means that Venezuelans’ yarning desire for  democracy as an ideal 
regime type remained resilient. [This is unclear. If confidence in democracy means support for 
democracy, it is true by definition. If confidence means trust, then we need to distinguish 
support for democracy as a general principle from the way the system behaves in its actual 
operations.--LJD Might it be better to say that the Venezuelan public’s aspiration to see 
democracy come to Venezuela remains robust?—PJC][We think support for democracy means 
different things in different contexts. In democracies, it is the confidence in the democratic 
systems. In non-democracies, democracy represents an ideal regime type. In the case of 
Venezuela, we think it is aspiration to see the current regime be replaced by a democratic one, 
not confidence in the current regime.— YHC_KPH]  
Venezuela shows that extreme executive aggrandizement is still vulnerable to backfire, 
and Putinism may last a long while but is not intrinsically irreversible. [This may be true, but it’s 
19 
 
a hard to generalize on the basis of a single case.  Putin, for example is still popular, and the 
incumbent in Zimbabwe got enough support to be able to claim he won the presidential 
election.—LJD] While it may require more rigorous causal analysis, our preliminary analysis 
suggests that when the popular  trust in legislature is at least not trailing too far behind that of the 
executive, movement in the two key indicators -- support for democracy and satisfaction with the 
way democracy works -- is more likely to yield a virtuous cycle. This more balanced popular 
foundation, in turn, helps promote regime stability. By default, this virtuous cycle is more likely 
to emerge under parliamentary than under either semi-presidential or presidential system since 
the latter is more liable to the syndrome of divided government. Lopsided trust in the executive, 
conversely, may suggest that citizens’ longing for a political “savior” to pull the country out of 
its predicament is becoming strong enough to open a door that an aggrandizing executive will be 
tempted to walk through.  [How can we be sure what is the cause and what the effect here? Do 
aggrandizing executives and polarization cause diverging views among social groups, or could 
it be the other way round? Readers will wonder how you prove causation.—PJC] [Do we know 
from the data that this is happening, that different social groups have different attitudes 
toward democracy? Can you give two or three examples?—LJD] [We have done some 
analyses but dropped that part from our previous version because there are many ways that we 
can disaggregate the constituencies. So here we present this just as a preliminary 
conclusion.—YHC_KPH]  
 




Is democracy backed up by a reservoir of people who doggedly support it no matter 
what? Our analysis shows a two-sided picture. On one side, people who live in Not Free or 
Partly Free countries tend to support democracy at high rates: They do not have it, and they want 
it. On the other side, citizens of Free countries often reveal to Barometer pollsters falling support 
for democracy. The common cause on both sides is declining satisfaction with government 
performance. In democratic countries, poor performance erodes support for democracy as a 
regime. In Not Free countries, poor government performance has the opposite effect: It seems to 
sustain and even increase commitment to democracy as a regime to be hoped for.   
The relationship between shifts in democratic satisfaction and shifts in support for 
democracy is important. When both democracy support and democratic satisfaction go up, we 
have a virtuous cycle: Satisfaction with government performance bolsters support for democracy 
as a regime. [We cut “best scenario” claim b/c surely the best ideal scenario is when 
democratic governments perform well so satisfaction is high and so is support for 
democracy.—LJD] When satisfaction lags support, this implies that there are dissatisfied 
democrats who demand better-performing democratic governance. That means in turn that 
ordinary people still cherish democracy as the ideal regime type.  
If both satisfaction and support drop into significant decline, you get a vicious cycle in 
which poor government performance robs democracy of its appeal. Finally, when satisfaction 
with democracy is higher than support for it, democracy (if it exists) is standing on shaky 
ground: The government’s performance is winning public approval but failing to build support 
for democracy as a regime that people prefer over all others on grounds firmer than “things seem 
to be going well at the moment.”  
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Most of the Free countries in this study have entered a vicious cycle, albeit from different 
starting points. In particular, Cape Verde, El Salvador, South Africa, and Uruguay have 
experienced two-digit declines in support and satisfaction with democracy. That said, Uruguay 
still boasts a higher level of popular support for democracy than any other Latin American 
country. Among the Free countries being surveyed Mongolia is the only country where the 
observed level of satisfaction has gone down but the support for democracy has gained some 
strength albeit from a rather low base.  The observed increment by 5 percentage points [Do you 
mean percentage points?—PJC], however, is not enough to elevate this struggling democracy 
from the “fragile” to “weak” category. Democracy’s popular foundation in Mongolia is still 
much shakier than the country’s consecutive “Free” rating might imply. Mongolians have been 
disappointed by poor governance since the country adopted multiparty elections in 1990. 
Although elections are generally free and fair, two patronage-wielding parties dominate the 
political scene, and rampant corruption has stalled democracy’s progress. The current 
government and set of political arrangements meet most democratic criteria, but people are 
alienated from the two main parties and long for a “real democracy” that responds to their needs.  
Among the Partly Free countries and territories, Hong Kong offers the most dramatic 
case of increasing democracy support. It went up by ten percentage points [OK??—PJC] [OK.—
KPH] while satisfaction with regime  performance plunged by 12 percentage points. [Give 
precise figure.—LJD] Recall that our figures stop at 2018—the current level of dissatisfaction 
with the lack of democratic reform that people in Hong Kong feel dates from before the massive 
protests of 2019. [The discussion of HK’s 2019 events should stop with this comment since the 
protests postdate the latest survey and therefore cannot explain the survey results.—LJD & 
PJC] By contrast, democratic support and satisfaction both went down by more than ten points 
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[OK??—PJC] [OK—YHC_KPH] in the Dominican Republic and Mozambique. The Dominican 
Republic faces not only a crisis involving immigration from Haiti, but also a political one caused 
by President Leonel Fernández’s desire for a third consecutive term (which would be his fourth 
term overall).  
Among Not Free countries, Cambodia under dictator Hun Sen stands out [along with 
Zimbabwe?--LJD][Zimbabwe shows declining democracy support amid increasing 
satisfaction. Thus, it is not comparable with Cambodia when satisfaction declines and support 
increases.—YHC_KPH] for the high level of democracy support expressed by its citizenry; 
support for democracy has increased from 61% to 74% while satisfaction with democracy 
dropped from 80% to 69% between 2006 and 2014.  [Give the figures here for Cambodia and 
Zimbabwe ad any other high-scoring Not Free countries. And what is the gap with democratic 
satisfaction?--LJD] In China, by contrast, support for democracy declined from 81% to 55% 
between 2008 and 2016, while satisfaction with the way “democracy” was working in the 
country declined from 88% to 72% over the same period. [Exact years and numbers needed. 
Please fill them in.—LJD] Although democracy entails different meanings there, government 
performance falling short of promises also lowered support for that regime. To what extent some  
unforeseen calamities such as the novel coronavirus outbreak of late 2019 and early 2020 might 
intensify this effect deserves further scrutiny. [Authors:  Do you want to add a few lines here 
about how the Communist party-state’s lack of transparency and urge to suppress bad news 
seem to have made matters worse, especially in the crucial early days after acute cases began 
appearing?—eds.]  
Taken together, the GBS findings reviewed here show that, no matter what definitions 
people attach to democracy, most ordinary citizens among our surveyed countries still view it as 
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an “ideal” regime that is worthy of their support. Yet in Free countries, chronic problems of 
public corruption and unresponsive authorities have driven down support for democracy and 
created a vacuum that populist leaders may exploit to undermine democratic institutions. In 
countries that are not so free, there is a reservoir of support for democracy, but this only appears 
when people realize that abandoning freedom does not guarantee better governance in return.  
The next decade promises a continued struggle between the demands of peoples for more 
democracy and the ambitions of elites to hang onto power. Governmental performance is the key 
thing to watch, since there seems to be a threshold of “bad” below which it starts to drag down 
support for democracy as a regime. As structural and institutional factors continue to diminish 
state capacity in many countries, democracy is likely facing another lackluster decade.    
Are we observing the waning of the third-wave democracies? Have the third-wave 
democracies experienced a lost decade? From the perspective of ordinary people, there have 
been visible and significant setbacks. Although expert surveys were sunnier and concluded that 
the retreat of the third-wave democratization between 2005 and 2016 was worrying but not 
threatening, results based on popular surveys showed a precipitous fall in support for democracy 
across countries during the same period, with much stronger reasons for pessimism.  
Democratic aspirations still run high in East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa despite 
increasing dissatisfaction with how democratic governments work in practice. Latin America is 
its own story. Democratic satisfaction and support ran strong during the boom years from 2002 
to 2008, only to fall as economic crisis gripped one country after another. But in Latin America, 
at least, the third wave is over: The region is no longer fully democratic.  
In countries veering toward or mired in authoritarianism, levels of support for democracy 
as a regime often run high. The support represents a lament as well as an aspiration. The greatest 
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risk to existing democracy is to be found in countries where citizens trust the executive far more 
than they trust the legislature. This imbalance tends to lower citizens’ support for democracy 
while increasing their satisfaction with its perceived performance: They feel that their elected 
(typically populist) chief executive is going to set things right at last. The polarization that 
typically accompanies populism’s rise afflicts not only less free countries, but stable liberal 
democracies as well.  
Unlike expert surveys, surveys of everyday people provide an evaluation based on all 
major aspects of social, political, and economic life in a given society. This is an indispensable 
source of information that can detect ground-level dynamics before the watershed events to 
which experts react.  
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